![]() Others have argued that justices tend to delay retirement from the Court in purposeful disregard for their old age, “decrepit” health ( Garrow 2000), and superannuated tenure ( Epstein et al. First, we examine determinants of labor force exit by mortality and retirement in this “small but extremely important social group” ( Preston 1977:171) that has escaped prior demographic analysis, even as its retirement and mortality patterns have captured demographic notice and popular attention (e.g., Garrow 1998 Greenhouse 2007 Toobin 2007 USA Today 2007 Woodward and Armstrong 1979). We use these models to exploit unique features of Supreme Court appointments and data for three purposes. Supreme Court justices from 1789 through 2006. This article constructs demographic models of retirement and death in office of U.S. Using data on every justice from 1789 through 2006, with robust, cluster-corrected, discrete-time, censored, event-history methods, we (1) estimate retirement effects of pension eligibility, age, health, and tenure on the timing of justices’ retirements and deaths in office, (2) resolve decades of debate over the politicized departure hypothesis that justices tend to alter the timing of their retirements for the political benefit or detriment of the incumbent president, (3) reconsider the nature of rationality in retirement decisions, and (4) consider the relevance of organizational conditions as well as personal circumstances to retirement decisions. Models build on prior multistate labor force status studies, and data permit an unusually clear distinction between voluntary and “induced” retirement. ![]() Supreme Court justices, a group that has gained demographic notice, evaded demographic analysis, and is said to diverge from expected retirement patterns. We construct demographic models of retirement and death in office of U.S. ![]()
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